Responsibility -The legal responsibility of the anesthesiologist in this country is clearly defined in Bulletin 42 of the Joint ('ommission on Accreditation of Hospitals.' Medical gases are drugs and the correctness of their use is similar to that in any other medical therapy. This responsibility cannot be delegated to nonqualified personnel. The Joint Commission accredits hospitals on the basis of national standards. Recognition by the courts of the status of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals stresses the importance of knowledge and of compliance with N.F.P.A. standards." These standards. or codes, are incorporated into law in some states. The adoption of Standards for Patient Care by the American Society of Anesthesiologists has established a standard of care, not for the local community alone, but for the whole country. Wasrnuth,'' has stated that "these standards would not have the efiect of law but could be entered into evidence by a plaintiff in an attempt to set a standard of care, the standard set by the defendant's peers." A recent edi-torial+ in the Journal of the Association of Anaesthetists of Great Britain and Ireland, concerned with delegation of responsibility to nonmedical personnel, pointed out that there is a moral, if not a legal, responsibility on the part of the anesthesiologist regarding pipeline installation and maintenance.
Reporting of Cases -In a discussion with two insurance carriers" in the field of medical and hospital protection, and in a review of the reports submitted to them, it was apparent that accidents involving infringement of standards continue to occur. Some accidents, like fires and explosions," achieve national publicity but others, less dramatic, involving gas mixups rarely receive wide coverage. It is impossible to discover the frequency of accidents of this type. Near misses are rarely publicized. A pharmacologic insult or a physiologic trespass is avidly reported but loss of life from simple mechanical error is rarely so. Medicolegal implications delay reporting; settlements are the general rule since the verdict is usually a foregone conclusion. Thus, the profession is largely unaware of hazards involving medical gas piping systems in their everyday practice. Anesthesiologists are urged to report these cases to the N.F.P.A. or to the American Society of Anesthesiologists. Cases reviewed in this paper probably represent only a fraction of accidents that have occurred.
A number of significant N.F.P.A. standards are discussed following.
N.F.P.A. 56 FLAMMABLE ANESTHETICS'"
This standard was initiated in 1941; the present edition was revised in 1968. This code states, "the composite methods whereby the hazards of fire and explosion attending the use of flammable mixtures as anesthetics may be reduced, with due regard for the hazard of electric shock from power and lighting circuits."
Fires and explosions in operating rooms are rare today. Safety regulations are generally accepted, and probably nonflammable agents comprise 80 per cent of all general anesthetics.R Yet, in a review of reports of two insurance companies and N.F.P.A. files, six accidents were discovered that occurred in the past 4 years: A 3-year-old child died from an explosion during an ether anesthetic for tonsillectomy, when electrocoagulation was applied to the tonsil bed.
An explosion resulted from cautery applied to a tongue lesion, 2 minutes following the cessation of cyclopropane anesthesia.
These cases demonstrate complete disregard of safety standards.
The following 2 cases were probably caused by static electricity:
An explosion occurred in an anesthesia machine while an absorber canister was being changed. No injury resulted to the patient. The anesthetic mixture being used was ether and oxygen.
A child died from injuries received from an explosion that occurred at the termination of a tonsillectomy. The anesthetic consisted of a cyclopropane induction followed by halothane maintenance.
In Santiago, Chile, 1964, 2 patients, 2 anesthesiologists, and 2 surgeons were killed and 3 operating room personnel were mutilated by an explosion. A cyclopropane cylinder had been partially filled, in error, with oxygen and subsequently charged with cyclopropane, thus producing a classical organic oxidizer explosion upon opening the cylinder valve.!)
In February 1968, a 38-year-old patient died following an explosion in an anesthetic machine. The anesthetic was cyclopropane and oxygen. The cause of the explosion has not yet been determined.
The use of flammable agents, though markedly reduced, continues both for teaching and for the intrinsic clinical value of these anesthetic agents. Where clinical conditions permit the use of nonflammable agents, the employment of flammable anesthetics, on the basis of tradition or personal preference, is to be decried. operating room construction and obviate fire hazards, but would constitute a major restriction in the choice of anesthetic agents.
Use of Flammable Agents for Skin Preparation -Flammable agents for preoperation skin preparation require the same care in handling as when they are used as anesthetic agents.
Flames engulfed a 67-year-old man when fumes from ether, used for skin preparation, contacted the compressor motor on a hypothermia machine.
During a hip nailing operation, fire occurred under the drapes when ether, which had been used for skin preparation, was ignited by an x-ray apparatus.
The danger of fire or explosions should be pointed out to all members of the surgical team not only when flammable agents are employed for anesthesia but also when used for other purposes such as skin preparation.
Plastic Materlals --Plastic material is increasingly utilized in operating rooms. Many of these materials are nonconductive and are capable of electrostatic generation. The hazard of static discharge from such plastics is very evident.
Three men were killed during adjustment of a plastic cover over a solid-propellant rocket motor. Static discharge from the plastic ignited the motor's electroexplosive igniter squib.'' This accident focused the attention of scientists in industry and in the National Aeronautics a n d S p a c e Administration ( NASA) on the problem of static electricity in plastic materials. As a result of this research, a plastic has been developed that is permanently destaticized.'? Organic antistat additives incorporated in the plastic resin blends, form a microscopic conductive layer capable of draining off any static charge.
Electrical Hazards -Code 56 not only guards against fire hazards but also protects against electric shock and interference with operating room circuits by the use of isolation transformers. Meyer'" and Bruner,*a in recent reviews concerning electric hazards, emphasized the urgency for stricter adherence to this code and also to the National Electrical Code N.F.P.A. No. 70, 1968.79 With the increased use of nonflammable agents, electronic equipment is being used with greater complacency. Manufacturers create a false sense of security in anesthesiologists by not clearly labeling their equipment as being safe or unsafe in combustible atmospheres.
Before administering or changing to a flammable mixture, anesthesiologists must be absolutely sure that only safe equipment is present in the hazardous location. New equipment, whether for use by surgeons or anesthesiologists, must be inspected by competent electronic engineers cognizant of the requirements of this code. Safe or unsafe apparatus should be clearly labeled regarding use in combustible atmospheres.
Testing for Conductivity -Testing of floor conductivity is an established practice but few hospitals are aware that the 1968 edition of N.F.P.A. 56 requires monthly testing of all rubber accessories attached to the anesthesia machine. N.F.P.A. Standard 565 is unknown to most anesthesiologists. In the past year four known deaths have resulted from failure to be familiar with this standard. An understanding of the essentials of a pipeline system is necessary for the prevention of these needless tragedies ( fig. 1 ).
Starting at the gas manifold, protection is offered by cylinder valve outlet and inlet connections of specified dimensions for each medical gas.'> The piping from the gas sources is identified by appropriate labeling at intervals of not more than 20 feet. Station outlets terminate the pipeline with diameter index safety system connectors (D.I.S.S.) l o or with safety-keyed, noninterchangeable quick couplers. The D.I.S.S. is vital to this standard, relating to the specific size of the screw and thread for each medical gas connections. The D.I.S.S. connections can be applied only to specified sections of the pipeline systems. Anesthesia machines are connected to the system by droplines fitted with D.I.S.S. connectors or quick couplers. Connection of these lines to the internal piping of the anesthesia machine is by a D.I.S.S. connector or quick coupler, depending on the type of installation. The internal piping of the anesthetic machine is of common copper tubing of similar size for each gas.
Where have failures occurred in the abovedescribed system to cause accidents? Cases reviewed show the major fault was at the connection of pipelines to the internal piping of the anesthesia machine, especially where this junction was performed by non- qualified personnel (fig. 2 ) . children the rear of an anesthesia machine that had been converted to a pipeline system. In 1966, a 3-year-old child died during a tonsillectomy, because of a nitrous oxide-oxygen mixup at the ceiling connections. In 1967, two mothers died at delivery under anesthesia; again nitrous oxide and oxygen hoses were wrongly connected to the internal piping of the machine.
This hazard of gas mixup has also occurred abroad. A nitrous oxide pipe was tapped for oxygen in a hospital emergency room, contributing to the death of 5 patients.
In all these cases nitrous oxide was delivered to the patient instead of oxygen. Testing for the presence of oxygen in the designated outlet on the anesthetic machine or station outlet was neglected prior to clinical use of the equipment. final pressure testing and flushing of the piping system, the outflow from each designated and labeled oxygen outlet station shall be tested, using an oxygen analyser, to confirm the presence of the desired concentration of oxygen. This test shall also be applied when changes are made to a piping system. Note: A similar procedure should be followed at the patient outlet of anesthesia machines and other oxygen dispensing equipment supplied by an oxygen piping system."
Pin Indexing -The Pin Indexing System for Medical Gas Cylinder Connections17 was incorporated in the 1952 edition of N.F.P.A. 565. It has prevented many accidents since its universal adoption by anesthesiologists and the medical gas industry.
Yet in 1967 two deaths in a small hospital were apparently related to the absence of this safeguard on an old anesthetic machine. Nitrous oxide was connected to the oxygen yoke, resulting in the tragedies. Other Hazards -Another source of danger is leaking cylinder valves on oxygen tanks labeled "Full" but actually empty. The danger of such tanks in emergency situations is obvious. The finding of such empty cylinders should be reported to the gas supplier every time discovered. Anesthesiologists can contribute to these hazardous situations by not replacing empty oxygen cylinders or by not closing the valves on tanks completely at the end of the administration of an anesthetic.
Clutton-Brock,lS in his account of the contamination of nitrous oxide by higher oxides of nitrogen in gas cylinders, reveals the importance of being aware of the fact of human error and of being alert to detect and to treat the results of these errors. Only his immediate recognition that an emergency situation existed as a result of this contamination and an exacting investigation prevented a major disaster. N.F.P.A. 565 is of concern not only to the Hospital Administration and Engineering Departments but also to the Department of Anesthesiology. Safe anesthesia requires that the anesthesiologist take an interest in the whole mechanism of medical gas distribution.
Decisions regarding the supply and installation of medical gases, pipelines, and anesthesia apparatus cannot be left to the sole discretion of the hospital purchasing officer or engineer. Accidents that have occurred suggest that anesthesiologists have neglected their responsibilities in this regard.
STANDARD FOR INHALATION THERAPY,7C N.F.P.A. No. 566
This standard applies to the use of nonflammable medical gases at normal atmospheric pressures, vapors, and aerosols, and the equipment required for their administration in inhalation therapy.
Oxygen tent fires as a cause of death have been known to anesthesiologists for many years (fig. 3 ) . Spacecraft fires, with their loss of life, have emphasized the hazard of oxygen-enriched atmospheres.
Fire, mechanical, chemical, and electrical hazards can and do exist in inhalation therapy. This standard presents means of avoiding or reducing these dangers.
The following cases illustrate these facts: fire probably resulting from an electric motor overheating or an electric short circuit.
A 7-year-old child narrowly escaped death from a fire caused by a spark from a friction toy in an oxygen tent.
Fire during intermittent positive pressure breathing was fatal to a 67-year-old man who lighted a cigarette while receiving therapy.
Many anesthesiologists are aware of fires caused by matches, cigarette lighters, or other common sources of ignition in oxygen tents in their own hospitals. The N.F.P.A. Committee on Hospitals has for the past 6 years deliberated on a code designed to reduce the frequency of these occurrences. It is a simple code written not only for anesthesiologists but also for technicians and others engaged in inhalation therapy.
Major points considered in this code are the apparatus itself and areas of hazard involved. Oxygen tents and similar enclosures differ from masks or endotracheal tubes in the degree of risk to patients receiving oxygen. Proximity to the oxygen-enriched at-mosphere increases the hazard. The basic requirements of this standard have been formulated with these points in mind.
Apparatus has been classified 3s that containing less than 2 L. of oxygen, such as nasal catheters, masks, ventilators, or endotracheal tubes, and that containing more than 2 L. by volume, such as an oxygen tent. The areas surrounding equipment are designated as the site of administration and the area of administration (figs. 4 and 5).
The site of administration is the environment surrounding the apparatus, which in the case of an oxygen tent extends 5 feet from the apparatus. For apparatus containing less than 2 L. of oxygen, the site of administration is 1 foot surrounding the apparatus. Proscribed from this danger environment is any electric apparatus unless specifically listed for oxygen-enriched atmospheres, as well as friction toys, transistorized radios, and highly-combustible materials such as nitrocellulose used in spectacle frames, oils, alcohols, etc.
The area of administration is the room involved, or, in the case of a multibed ward, an area of 15 feet surrounding the oxygenadministration apparatus. Open flames, cigarettes, heaters, etc., are prohibited in this area. Cigarettes, matches, and cigarette lighters must be removed not only from the patient receiving oxygen therapy but also from other patients within 15 feet of the apparatus.
An exception to the above requirements permits unlisted electric apparatus such as a wall lamp to be used at the site of administration if it is permanently affixed to the adjacent wall or bed, and provided it cannot be moved into the oxygen-enriched atmosphere. Listed equipment denotes approval of such equipment for use in hazardous locations by nationally recognized testing laboratories such as Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc."
The N.F.P.A. Committee on Hospitals has produced a standard for safety with minimum interference with clinical use in inhalation therapy technics. Appended to 56B, a standard for Inhalation Therapy, are recommendations dealing with rescue of patients and the extinguishing of fires in oxygen-enriched atmospheres. Not only anesthesiologists but also all personnel involved in patient care should be familiar with these recommendations.
TENTATIVE STANDARD FOR HYPERBARIC FACILITIES,Td N.F.P.A. NO. 56D-T, 1968
"During the past decade there has been a widespread interest in the use of oxygen therapy under elevated pressures to saturate the tissues of the patient's body with oxygen, as treatment for certain disorders or as preparation for surgical or radiographic therapy.
"The purpose of this standard, N.F.P.A. No. 56D-T, 1968 , is to set forth minimum safeguards for the protection of patients and personnel administering hyperbaric therapy and experimental procedures. Its purpose is also to offer some guidance for rescue personnel who might not ordinarily be involved in such an emergency."
The stringent requirements of this standard were prompted by the obvious hazard of fire occurring under hyperbaric conditions of materials generally increases as the partial pressure of oxygen increases even when the percentage of oxygen in the gas mixture remains constant. This safety standard is concerned primarily with protection against fire and explosion hazards created by laboratory activities in hospitals.
Highly flammable liquids and explosive gases are in common use in these areas. As recent as January 1968, a research worker was killed and another was seriously injured as a result of an explosion in a laboratory.
Anesthesiologists engaged in laboratory work should obtain this tentative standard and also bring it to the attention of others concerned in hospital safety.
STANDARD FOR ESSENTIAL ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS FOR HOSPITALS," N.F.P.A. No. 76, 1967
"Medical and nursing sciences are becoming progressively more dependent upon electrical apparatus for the preservation of life of hospitalized patients."
Heart pumps, ventilators, cardiac monitors and pacemakers, and other electrical devices require circuits that will provide instantaneous resumption of power in the event of failure of the primary system. Also, lighting is essential in strategic areas in order that precise procedures may be carried out, and power is needed to safeguard such vital services as tissue and blood banks.
Interruption of normal electrical service to hospitals may be caused by catastrophes such as storms, floods, fires, earthquakes, or explosions; by pyramiding failures of substations transmitting electrical power; or by incidents within the hospital. For all such situations, electrical systems should be planned to limit internal disruption and to provide for continuity of vital services at all times. Outages may be corrected in seconds or may require hours for correction. This implies that the system of protection must be designed to cope with the longest probable outage, which experience indicates is infrequently as long as 6 to 8 hours, but in extreme cases may persist for many days.
"Selecting vital areas and functions considered to be essential, designing safeguards to assure continuity in these circuits, and maintaining the electrical components of such essential services so that they will work when called on, are complex problems that warrant standardized guidance for regulating agencies, governing bozrds and administration of hospitals, and architects and engineers concerned with hospital construction. Such guidance is offered in this standard."
Anesthesiologists should be concerned that operating rooms, recovery rooms, intensive-care wards, and like areas, containing patients dependent on electrical apparatus for vital functions, are equipped with electrical circuits meeting the requirements of this standard.
Locking-type plugs should be installed on the power cords of life-sustaining equipment to prevent accidental dislodgement from outlets of essential electrical systems. Such power outlets should be distinctively labeled "Essential Electrical Circuit." SUMMARY National Fire Protection Association codes are relevant to the practice of anesthesia. Reporting of cases is necessary for development of codes. Anesthesiologists have a responsibility concerning enforcement of standards and to call these to the attention of hospital safety officials. Cases involving infringement of codes are reported. Current and new codes are reviewed.
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